when needs differ by The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Udo Ebert* 
 
Ethical inequality measures and the redistribution of income  
when needs differ 
 
 
 
January 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  Address:  Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg, 
Germany 
 Tel.:  (+49)441-798-4113 
 Fax:  (+49)441-798-4116 
 e-mail:  ebert@uni-oldenburg.de 
 
 Abstract 
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1. Introduction
1 
The principle of progressive transfers postulates that the redistribution of (a small amount of) 
income from a richer individual to a poorer one increases the level of social welfare and 
decreases the degree of inequality. The idea goes back to Pigou and was generalized by 
Dalton (1920). The principle is without doubt the foundation stone of a normative theory of 
redistribution: Whenever one income distribution is more equal than another one (with the 
same average income) – measured by Lorenz dominance, it can be generated by a finite series 
of progressive transfers from the original income distribution. In this case, however, the indi-
viduals considered have to be identical in every respect but possibly income. Things become 
much more complicated if we assume that the economic units under consideration may also 
differ with respect to further attributes: For instance households can have different size or 
needs. Then it is not at all clear what kind of income transfer may improve welfare and 
equality since two variables – income and needs – have to be taken into account. Furthermore, 
the concept of inequality used has to be taken into consideration, as well. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate some principles of redistribution in a hetero-
geneous framework systematically and to discuss their implications for the measurement of 
welfare. Moreover we translate these results to the measurement of inequality and derive the 
corresponding ethical inequality measures. We also examine various inequality concepts. The 
underlying framework can be described simply: a typical household can be characterized by 
its income and its type. (Both variables can in principle be observed!) We assume throughout 
the paper that household types can be ranked by needs.  
Then a transfer principle has at first to compare the situation of the households involved: 
which one is ‘richer’, and which one ‘poorer’? Here the notions of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ have to 
take into consideration the living standards, i.e. the level of income and the household’s 
needs. Thus the principles crucially depend on the comparability of these information. The 
weakest principle is only able to compare the level of income and needs separately, i.e. a 
household can be identified as the ‘richer’ one if its income is higher and if it is less needy. 
Thus the ranking of living standards is a dominance criterion and is incomplete. The strongest 
one is able to compare the situation of households with arbitrary incomes and needs. Here a 
complete ordering of the living standard of households is given. Between these extremes two 
further possibilities are discussed. Then in a second step, when the measuring of ‘richer’ and 
‘poorer’ has been clarified, the transfer itself has to be defined. 
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We examine a general class of social welfare orderings. The corresponding welfare functions 
are nested: at first the level of welfare of all households having the same type is determined. 
Then these welfare levels are aggregated to an overall welfare ordering in the second step. 
This class contains the set of separable welfare functions as proper subclass. Since ethical 
inequality measures are to be derived, the welfare orderings have to possess an appropriate 
homogeneity property depending on the inequality concept chosen. In the paper we consider 
linear inequality concepts (which are the only coherent inequality views, cf. Ebert (2004)), i.e. 
we derive measures according to the relative, absolute, intermediate, and reference-point 
inequality view.  
The transfer principles introduced have different power. The weakest one only assumes that 
income and needs can be ranked. Another one allows to compare the income of different 
household types by using one-sided bounds. A third one is based on two-sided bounds. 
Finally, the strongest principle is formulated on the basis of an equivalent income function. It 
corresponds to the between-type transfer principle used in the literature. The transfer prin-
ciples are imposed in two different ways: at first only transfers between two particular house-
hold types are considered. In a second step transfers between arbitrary subpopulations are 
admitted. The implications of these principles for the form of welfare orderings and inequality 
measures are derived for a fixed population. Furthermore, depending on the transfer principle 
imposed the corresponding classes are described completely. As expected, the weaker the 
transfer axiom the greater is the corresponding class of measures. We obtain some classes 
which have not yet been presented in the literature.  
There are few papers dealing with this topic: Ebert (1995) introduces one generalized Pigou-
Dalton principle for the measurement of relative inequality. Ebert (1997) is concerned with an 
analogous principle for absolute inequality. Shorrocks (1995) is primarily interested in some 
(incomplete) welfare and inequality orderings. In Ebert (2004) a different approach is used: 
here equivalent income functions and weights reflecting the type of household are given a 
priori and then a between-type transfer principle is imposed on a class of welfare and 
inequality orderings. To sum up, a systematic and general analysis of transfer principles for 
linear inequality concepts is still missing. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the notation. Section 3 presents the 
framework. In section 4 the transfer principles are defined and discussed. Their implications 
are investigated. Section 5 concludes.   - 3 -
2. Notation 
We investigate a heterogeneous population. There are  2 n ≥  types of household having 
different composition and/or needs. So we face n homogeneous subpopulations. We will 
assume that a household of type i comprises i adults, but this assumption is not necessary. 
Each subpopulation  , 1,..., ii n = , consists of  i n  households of type i. The total number of 
households is denoted by 
1
:
n
i
i
Nn
=
=∑ . It is important that the household types can be ranked 
by needs. They are numbered by increasing needs. We assume that the income 
i
j X  and the 
type i of a household j can be observed. Of course, households can vary in income. Each 
income has to be feasible, i.e. 
i
j d X ∈Ω , where  ( ) , d d Ω =∞  denotes the set of feasible 
incomes. For  0 d =  we obtain  0 ++ Ω= \  and for d = −∞  the set  −∞ Ω = \. Incomes are either 
bounded from below or may be arbitrary. We can interpret d as minimum or reference 
income. If income is negative it is assumed that a household is able to survive by getting 
credit or by using savings. If 
i
j d X ∈Ω  the income 
i
j X d −  is called normalized income for 
d ∈\. It is the amount of income of household j measured with respect to the minimum 
(reference) income. 
Let  ( ) 1,...,
i
i
n iii
nd XXX =∈ Ω  denote an income vector of subpopulation i. A vector of incomes 
for the overall population is given by  ( )
1,...,
nN XX X = ∈Ω . The average income of X is 
denoted by  ()
i
j X XN µ =ΣΣ . Furthermore, let  k 1  denote a vector of k ones. An ordering 
defined on 
N
d Ω  is represented by  d \ , where ~d  and  d ;  denote its symmetric and, respec-
tively, asymmetric part. 
3.  Welfare and inequality 
In the following we describe the framework we are interested in and prove a number of 
general results. They will provide the background for the analysis performed in the next 
section. At first we will introduce social welfare orderings. Then the class of coherent 
inequality concepts is presented and the derivation of ethical inequality measures is discussed. 
If an inequality measure has to be consistent with one of the inequality concepts examined, 
the underlying welfare ordering has to satisfy a homogeneity property. Therefore the class of 
feasible welfare orderings is determined. It turns out that the corresponding welfare functions   - 4 -
are well-structured. They allow us to describe the corresponding class of ethical inequality 
orderings/measures precisely.  
3.1 Welfare  orderings 
We will confine ourselves to a particular class of social welfare orderings 
W
d \  defined on 
N
d Ω  
which can be represented by nested social welfare functions. Therefore in a first step we 
define a social welfare ordering 
i W
d \  for each subpopulation  , 1,..., ii n = . We assume that it 
can be represented by  
  () ()
1
1
1
i n
ii
ii i j
j i
XV V X
n
ξ
−
=

= 
 ∑  (1) 
where : id V Ω→ \ is an increasing, strictly concave household utility function and where 
()
1
i Vt
−  denotes its inverse function. It turns out that  ( )
i
i X ξ  is the equally distributed equiva-
lent income (EDEI) of 
i X : if given to each household in subpopulation i this income yields 
the same level of welfare as 
i X . Because of the concavity of  i V  the ordering 
i W
d \  satisfies the 
(usual) principle of progressive transfers (the subpopulation is homogeneous!). In the second 
step we assume that the social welfare ordering 
W
d \  is defined on the vector 
() () ( )
1
1 ,...,
n
n XX ξξ  and that it can be represented by a welfare function  
  () () ()
1
1
n
i
ii i
i
WX V n V X βξ
−
=
 = 
 ∑  (2) 
where V is again strictly increasing and concave, and where  1,..., n β β  are strictly positive 
welfare weights. The basic idea underlying this construction can be described as follows: sub-
population i’s EDEI  ()
i
i X ξ  is the representative income of a household of this type. Since 
there are  i n  households in this subpopulation (we have to take into account the size of the 
subpopulation!) its total contribution to social welfare is  ( ) ( )
i
ii nV X ξ . It is weighted by  i β  
which is to reflect the needs of household type i. Furthermore, the welfare function at this 
level is also separable. If we replace  ( )
i
i X ξ  by its proper definition we see that the welfare   - 5 -
function  () WX is a nested function having two levels. Since all functions involved are linear 
or concave  () WX is strictly increasing and concave.
2 
Below, we require a social income function for the definition of ethical inequality orderings. 
The function represents the minimal amount of (aggregate) income that is just sufficient to 
yield the level of social welfare implied by a given income distribution (if total income is 
distributed optimally among households). We define it in analogy to an individual expenditure 
function in consumer theory by: 
  ()
1
1 ,..., 11
:m i n
i
n
nn
n n
i
j
ij
CX
λλ
λ
==
= ∑ ∑  (3a) 
 s.t.  () ()
1
1,...,
n
n
n WW X λλ = . (3b) 
Obviously there is a relationship to the concept of EDEI for homogeneous subpopulation. If 
there is only one subpopulation the value of the social income function is equal to the EDEI 
multiplied by the number of households. It is easy to see that the optimal incomes 
i
j λ , for 
1,..., i j n = , have to be identical (since  i V  is concave). Therefore  ( ) CX can also be repre-
sented by 
  ()
1,...,
1
min
n
n
ii
i
CX n
λλ λ
=
= ∑  (4a) 
 s.t.  () ()
1 1 ,...,
n nn n WW X λλ = 11 . (4b) 
3.2 Inequality  concepts 
Inequality measures (representing inequality orderings) are usually invariant with respect to a 
certain type of admissible transformation of incomes. Relative inequality measures do not 
change if all incomes are altered proportionally and absolute measures are invariant w.r.t. to 
adding the same amount to all incomes. In other words they are consistent with an inequality 
concept. We will examine the class of coherent inequality concepts (Ebert (2004a)). They 
have to satisfy two properties: path-independence and transfer-consistency. The first one 
requires that the composition of two admissible transformations is also admissible. Then 
                                                 
2  Another possibility of defining an ordering 
W
d \  is to use a separable welfare function from the beginning and 
to consider  () () ( )
1 i
ij WX V VX
− = ΣΣ . Then there is only one level. It turns out that both forms coincide if 
and only if we define  ( )( ) ii Vt Vt β =  for  1,..., in = .   - 6 -
‘having the same degree of inequality’ is a transitive relation. The second one postulates that 
if a (sequence of) progressive transfers is needed in order to obtain one distribution from 
another one, then so it is the case after applying the same admissible transformation to both 
distributions. It requires that a change in the size of incomes (admissible transformation) and a 
redistribution of income are compatible with one another. This criterion implies in particular 
that Lorenz dominance (appropriately defined) is preserved if the distributions involved are 
transformed by admissible transformations. 
It turns out that there is exactly one coherent inequality concept  d J  for every 
N
d Ω . The 
admissible transformations have to be linear. We obtain the functions 
  () ( )
d Tt td d λ λ =− +  for  d t∈Ω  and λ ++ ∈\  if d ∈\ and  (5a) 
  () Ttt α α
−∞ =+  for t −∞ ∈Ω  and α ∈\ if d = −∞ (5b) 
which define the transformations 
  () () ( ) ()
1
1 : ,...,
n
dd d n
n TX TX TX λλ λ =  and  () ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 : ,...,
n
n
n TX TX TX αα α
−∞ −∞ −∞ = . 
For  0 d =  and d =− ∞ we get the relative and, respectively, absolute inequality concept, for 
0 d <  the intermediate one and for  0 d >  reference-point inequality. They are discussed in 
more detail in Ebert (2004a). 
3.3  Ethical inequality orderings 
Ethical inequality orderings are derived from social welfare orderings. Suppose that 
W
d \  is a 
social welfare ordering for d ∈\. Then a corresponding inequality ordering 
I
d \  can be 
defined by means of the relative welfare loss due to inequality. It is calculated on the basis of 
the normalized income per household: 
  ()
() () () ()
()
: d
X dC X N d
IX
Xd
µ
µ
−− −
=
−
 for d ∈\. (6a) 
Similarly, we consider the absolute welfare loss per household for d = −∞ 
  () () () I XX C X N µ −∞ =− . (6b) 
These indicators determine the corresponding inequality orderings uniquely.  
But the orderings have to be consistent ( d J -invariant) with the inequality concept  d J , i.e.   - 7 -
  () ~
Id
d X TX λ  for all 
N
d X ∈Ω  and   if d λ ++ ∈ ∈ \\  (7a) 
and 
  () ~
Id X TX α −∞  for 
N
d X ∈Ω  and α ∈\. (7b) 
We call a social welfare ordering  d J -homogeneous with respect to the admissible trans-
formations if for all  ,
N
d XY∈Ω : 
  ( )( ) ~~
Wd W d
dd X YT XT Y λλ ⇔  for all λ ++ ∈\  if d ∈\ (8a) 
and, respectively, 
  () ( ) ~~
WW X YT X T Y αα
−∞ −∞
−∞ −∞ ⇔  for all α ∈\ if d = −∞ (8b) 
and get
3 
Proposition 1 
I
d \  is  d J -invariant if and only if the corresponding ordering 
W
d \  is  d J -homogeneous. 
Therefore  d J -homogeneity is a crucial property of the welfare orderings we want to consider.  
3.4  Homogeneous welfare orderings 
We restrict ourselves to the class of  d J -homogeneous welfare orderings which can be 
described precisely: 
Proposition 2 
a)  
W
d \  is  d J -homogeneous if and only if 
i W
d \  and the overall ordering defined on 
() () ( )
1
1 ,...,
n
n XX ξξ  are  d J -homogeneous.  
b)  F o r  d ∈\: 
W
d \  is  d J -homogeneous if and only if there are  () 1 , ,..., ,1 n εε ε∈∞  and 
12 1, ,..., n β ββ ++ =∈ \  such that 
W
d \  is represented by
4 
  () ()
1
11
1
i
i
i
n n
i ii
dj
ij hh i
n
WX X d d
nn
ε εε
ε β
β ==
 
 =− +   Σ  
∑∑  for 
N
d X ∈Ω . (9a) 
                                                 
3  All proofs have been relegated to the Appendix. 
4  If an exponent is equal to zero we have to use the corresponding geometric mean.   - 8 -
and  
  ()
1
11
1
i
i
i i n n
j ii
d
ij hh i i
Xd mn
WX d
mn n m
ε εε ε
==
   −   =+    Σ    
∑∑   for 
N
d X ∈Ω . (9b) 
where 
1
1
ii m ε β − = . 
c)  
W
−∞ \  is  −∞ J -homogeneous if and only if there are  1 , ,..., n γ γγ ++ ∈\  and 
12 1, ,..., n β ββ ++ =∈ \  such that 
W
d \  is represented by 
  ()
11
11
ln
i
i i
ij
n n
X ii
ij hh i
n
WX e
nn
γγ
γ β
γβ
−
−∞
==
 
 =−   Σ  
∑∑ for 
N X −∞ ∈Ω . (10a) 
and 
  () ()
11
11
ln
i
i i
ij i
n n
Xa i
ij i
n
WX e
Nn
γγ
γ
γ
−−
−∞
==
 
 =−    
∑∑   for 
N X −∞ ∈Ω . (10b) 
where 
1
ln ii a β
γ
= . 
Thus homogeneity has to be satisfied at both levels. In particular we get for the EDEI 
() ( ) () ( )
di d i
ii TX T X λλ ξξ = , for  1,..., in = . The feasible welfare functions have to be general-
ized Atkinson and, respectively, Kolm-Pollak social welfare functions.
5 At this stage the 
parameters  () 11 , ,...,  and  , ,..., nn ε εε γ γγ  may differ and may be chosen independently for the 
overall population and subpopulations. These parameters represent the respective inequality 
aversion. 
Closer inspection of the welfare functions (9a) and (10a) and the discussion in Ebert (1995, 
1997) demonstrate that homogeneous welfare orderings can also be represented in a different 
way. By introducing the constants  i m  and  i a  and rearranging we obtain (9b) and (10b). They 
are interpreted in the next subsection. 
                                                 
5  If we use the orderings described in footnote 1 and impose 
d J -homogeneity the corresponding welfare 
functions also possess the form (9) and, respectively, (10), but we obtain 
1 ...
n ε εε === and 
1 ...
n γ γγ === a priori.   - 9 -
3.5  Measurement of inequality 
Given the representation in Proposition 2 we are now able to derive the corresponding social 
income functions. We get 
Proposition 3 
a)  For d ∈\: The social income function for (9) is given by 
 
() ()
1
1
1
1
11 1 1
1
11 1
1
1
.
i
i
i
i
i
i
n nn
i ii
dh h j
hi j i
hh
i n nn
j ii
hh
hi j hh i i
n
CX n X d N d
n
n
Xd mn
mn N d
mn n m
ε
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε εε ε
β
β
β
−
== = −
== =
    =− +       Σ 
   −    =+     Σ     
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑
 (11) 
b)  For d =− ∞: The social cost function for (10) is given by 
 
()
()
11 1
11 1
11 1
ln ln
11
ln .
i
i i
ij
i
i i
ij i
n nn
X ii
ii
ij i i
n nn
Xa i
ii
ij i i
n
CXN e n
Nn
n
Ne n a
Nn
γγ
γ
γγ
γ
β
β
γγ
γ
−
−∞
== =
−−
== =
  
  =− +      
  
  =− +      
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑
  (12) 
By the definition of the social income function  1,..., n λ λ  represent the optimal incomes of 
household types 1,...,n. The optimality conditions of this minimization process are given by  
 
1
1
1
i
i
dd
d
mm
λ λ
λ
−−
== −  and 11 1 ii aa λ λλ − =−= for  1,..., in = .   (13) 
They can be rearranged to 
  1
1
1
i
ii
d
mm
λ
λ

=− − 

 and  1 ii a λ λ =−. (14) 
These equations can be interpreted as implicit equivalent income functions given single adults 
as reference type (see subsection 4.1 below and Ebert (2000b)) since they define the relation-
ship between the optimal incomes of different household types in an optimal income distribu-
tion. Therefore the constants  1,..., n mm  and  1,..., n aa  can be interpreted as relative and, respec-
tively, absolute implicit equivalence scales. Since the welfare functions are ordinal, relative   - 10 -
scales are unique up to a scale factor; absolute scales can be changed by adding a constant. 
Therefore, without loss of generality we can choose household type 1 (single adults) as 
reference type by setting  1 1 m =  and  1 0 a = .  ( )
i
ji X dm −  and, respectively, 
i
ji X a −  then 
represents the implicit equivalent income of a representative equivalent adult in household j of 
type i. For  , 0 dd ∈≠ \  we get a combination of relative and absolute scales.  
Using the definition of inequality measures presented in subsection 3.3 and the result of 
Proposition 3 we are now able to describe the inequality orderings more precisely.  
Proposition 4 
The social welfare functions (9) and (10) imply 
  () ()
1
11
1
1
i
i
i i n n
j ii
d d
ij hh i i
Xd mn
I XX
mn n m
ε εε ε
µ
==
   −   =−    Σ    
∑∑   (15) 
and 
  () () ()
11
11
ln
i
i i
ij i
n n
Xa i
ij i
n
IX X e
Nn
γγ
γ
µ
γ
−−
−∞ −∞
==
 
 =+    
∑∑   (16) 
where 
  ()
11
i i n n
j i
d
ij hh i
X d m
X
mn m
µ
==
 −
= 
Σ  ∑∑   and   () ()
11
1
i n n
i
ji
ij
X Xa
N
µ−∞
==
=− ∑∑ ,  (17) + (18) 
respectively. 
We will come back to these representations of the inequality measures in section 5. Now we 
turn to a systematic discussion of transfer principles and of their implications. 
4. Redistribution 
The starting point of the following analysis is the Pigou-Dalton principle for homogeneous 
populations. It requires that a progressive transfer (i.e. a transfer from a richer to a poorer 
individual which does not reverse the ranking of incomes) improves social welfare (and 
decreases inequality). In our framework things are more complicated since the households 
belonging to different subpopulations have different needs. These differences in needs have to 
be taken into account, as well, when income is redistributed.    - 11 -
In this section we will introduce four different types of progressive transfers between different 
subpopulations. They will differ with respect to the assumption made on the comparability of 
living standards which depend on income and needs. 
4.1 Transfer  principles 
The first kind of transfer takes into account only the ranking of income and needs. We intro-
duce 
WBT(d)  A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
i
k X  to 
i
k X δ −  and 
1 i
l X
+  to 
1 i
l X δ
+ +  is a 
Weak Between-Type Progressive Transfer if 
1 ii
kl XX δ δ
+ − >+ .  
The transfer redistributes income from a less needy and richer household to a needier and 
poorer household such that after redistributing income the first one is still richer than the 
second one. Here only information about the ranking of income and needs is required. Needs 
are not compared in a cardinal manner and it is clear that after the redistribution of income the 
household receiving the transfer is still worse off than the other one. The richer household is 
definitely better off than the poorer one, i.e. its income is higher and it is less needy. The 
definition can be employed for any d ∈\ and d = −∞. Furthermore, the condition compar-
ing incomes is equivalent to a formulation based on normalized incomes: 
  ( ) ( )
1 ii
kl X dX d δδ
+ −− > +−  for d ∈\. (19) 
This kind of transfer is similar to Hammond’s equity principle (which is applied to utility 
levels; cf. Hammond (1976)). It is identical with the transfer P3 used in Ebert (2000a) and 
also plays a role in Bourguignon (1989). 
Sometimes one is willing to compare the living standards of households belonging to different 
subpopulations ‘a little bit’; a(n upward) transfer from a household of type i to a household of 
type  1 i +  may even be desirable if the income of the recipient is a bit higher in the end than 
the income of the donor. The problem is to define the term ‘a bit higher’. Formally we intro-
duce  
UBT(d)  Assume that  1 i r < . A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
i
k X  to 
i
k X δ −  and 
1 i
l X
+  to 
1 i
l X δ
+ +  is an Upward Between-Type Progressive Transfer if  
  () ( )
1 ii
ki l X drX d δδ
+   −− > +−   .    - 12 -
In this case the constant  i r  determines the term ‘a bit’ precisely (in a relative way, i.e. by a 
ratio of incomes). The definition of this transfer is based on normalized income and is valid 
for d ∈\. For d =− ∞ we define 
UBT(−∞)  Assume that  0 i b < . A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
i
k X  to 
i
k X δ −  and 
1 i
l X
+  
to 
1 i
l X δ
+ +  is an Upward Between-Type Progressive Transfer if 
  ( ) ( )
1 ii
kl i X Xb δδ
+ −> ++ . 
Here the constant  i b  determines the bound. 
If 1 i r =  or  0 i b =  the transfer UBT(d) coincides with WBT(d). Thus an upward between-type 
progressive transfer is an extension of the latter type of transfer. It is easy to see that constants 
i r  or  i b  can really be chosen in practice. For instance two adults need a higher level of income 
than a single adult in order to be as well off. A constant  10 11 i r =  means that a transfer from 
the single to the couple is admissible as long as the couple’s (resulting) income is less than 
110 % of the single person’s income. 
If a needier household’s income is high enough we can also redistribute income to a less 
needy one. E.g. if a couple’s income is (more than) twice as high as a single adult’s income it 
seems to be better off. Therefore we introduce 
DBT(d)  Assume that  1 i s > . A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
1 i
l X
+  to 
1 i
l X δ
+ −  and 
i
k X  
to 
i
k X δ +  is a Downward Between-Type Progressive Transfer if 
  () ( )
1 ii
li k X dsX d δδ
+  −− > +−    
for d ∈\ and 
DBT(−∞)  Assume that  0 i c > . A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
1 i
l X
+  to 
1 i
l X δ
+ −  and 
i
k X  to 
i
k X δ +  is a Downward Between-Type Progressive Transfer if 
  ( ) ( )
1 ii
lk i X Xc δδ
+ −> ++ . 
The interpretation of this kind of transfer is analogous.   - 13 -
Finally we assume that we are able to compare living standards completely. Suppose that an 
equivalent income function
6 E is explicitly defined in the following way: Choosing household 
type 1 (single adults) as reference type we introduce an equivalent income function E as a 
vector of n functions  : id d E Ω→ Ω, where  ( ) i Et denotes the income a single adult requires 
in order to be as well off as a household with i adults and household income t. (Here it is 
assumed implicitly that all members belonging to a household attain the same living 
standard.) The functions  i E  have to satisfy some properties which allow us to make meaning-
ful comparisons. 
(i)  () 1 Et t =  
(ii)  () i Et is continuous and strictly increasing in t  
(iii)  () i Et is strictly decreasing in i    
(iv)  () i Et is an invertible function. 
For an interpretation of these properties see e.g. Ebert (2000b). 
() i Et is called equivalent income. Then a household of type i is better off than a household of 
type h if and only if  ( ) ( )
ih
ij h k EX EX >  for any  { } , 1,..., hi n ∈ . If  ( ) ( )
ih
ij h k EX EX =  the living 
standards are the same. When an equivalent income function is given the living standards 
(equivalent incomes) of arbitrary households and household types can be compared. Then we 
define an appropriate transfer for d ∈\ or d = −∞ by 
SBT(d)  A transfer of income  0 δ >  changing 
i
k X  to 
i
k X δ −  
11  to 
ii
ll XX δ
++   −   and 
1 i
l X
+  to 
1 i
l X δ
+ +    to 
ii
kk XX δ  +   is a Strong Between-Type Progressive Transfer if 
( ) ( )
1
1
ii
ik i l EX E X δ δ
+
+ −> + ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
il i k EX E X δ δ
+
+  −> +  .  
It is the ‘usual’ Between-Type Progressive Transfer used in the literature (see e.g. Ebert 
(2004b)).  
After having introduced four different kinds of transfers we define the corresponding 
Principles of Transfers which will be denoted by the same acronyms. They require that the 
respective transfer improves social welfare (and decreases inequality).  
                                                 
6  See Donaldson and Pendakur (2004)   - 14 -
In the following we will always assume that the social welfare ordering 
W
d \  can be repre-
sented by a welfare function satisfying (9a) and, respectively, (10a). The implications for the 
representation (9b) and (10b) are discussed in section 5. 
4.2 Two  subpopulations 
Since we want to analyze the implications of the transfer principles in detail we at first 
consider two subpopulations i and  1 i + . It is clear that the results depend on the principle 
chosen and the inequality concept considered. The latter determines a class of feasible social 
welfare orderings (see Proposition 2). Given this class of welfare orderings and the social 
welfare functions which represent them we can describe the implications of a transfer 
principle by two conditions: The parameters ( 1 ,, ii ε εε +  and, respectively,  1 ,, ii γ γγ + ) have to be 
related and we obtain a condition on the weights  1 , ii β β + .  
(a)  Principle WBT 
Starting with d ∈\ we obtain  
Proposition 5a 
 
W
d \  satisfies WBT(d) for d ∈\ if and only if  
 [ 1 ii ε εε + ≤≤ for  1 0 i ε + > ,  (20a) 
  1 0 ii ε εε + =≤< for  1 0 i ε + ≤  and  0 i ε >  (20b) 
  1 ii ε εε + == for  1 0 i ε + ≤  and  0 i ε ≤ , (20c) 
and 
 
1
1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii
ii nn
εε ε ε
εε
β β
+
+
−−
+
+
  
≤   
  
]. 
In this case we have to distinguish several cases as far as the parameters are concerned: It 
turns out that the parameter (inequality aversion) of the receiver  1 i ε +  must not exceed (be 
higher than) the parameter (inequality aversion) of the total population ε  which in turn must 
be less (higher) than or equal to the donor’s parameter (inequality aversion)  i ε . In other words 
the inequality aversion of the needier subpopulation has to be weakly higher than the aversion 
of the less needy one. This is true as long as the parameters are strictly positive. If at least one   - 15 -
is nonpositive, two or all three parameters have to be identical. Otherwise it is impossible to 
satisfy WBT(d). Furthermore we get a condition on the weights  i β  and  1 i β + . It may also 
depend on the size of the subpopulations involved. The condition requires that the weight of 
the needier subpopulation is greater than the other one. 
For d =− ∞ we obtain a clearer result: 
Proposition 5b 
 
W
d \  satisfies WBT() −∞  if and only if  1 ii γ γγ + = =  and  1 ii β β + ≤ . 
In this case all parameters have to be identical and the coefficients have to be nondecreasing 
in needs. 
(b)  Principle UBT 
We know that UBT is a more general transfer principle than WBT since here an additional 
bound is given. In this case the conditions on the weights  i β  and  1 i β +  are stricter: 
Proposition 6 
a)  
W
d \  satisfies UBT(d) for d ∈\ if and only if (20) and 
1
1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii i
ii
r
nn
εε ε ε
εε
ε β β
+
+
−−
−
+
+
  
≤   
  
. 
b)  
W
d \  satisfies UBT(−∞) if and only if  1 ii γ γγ + = =  and 1
ii b
ii e
γ β β + ≤ . 
Since 1 i r <  and  0 i b <  the increase of  1 i β +  measured with respect to  i β  has to be even larger 
than above. 
(c)  Principle DBT 
As one would expect the results for downward transfers are essentially analogous. We have to 
replace (20) by 
  1 ii ε εε + ≤≤  for  0 i ε >  (21a) 
  1 0 ii ε εε + =≤<  for  0 i ε ≤  and  1 0 i ε + >  (21b) 
  1 ii ε εε + ==  for  0 i ε ≤  and  1 0 i ε + ≤ . (21c) 
Then we obtain   - 16 -
Proposition 7 
a)  
W
d \  satisfies DBT(d) for d ∈\ if and only if (21) and 
1
1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii i
ii
s
nn
εε ε ε
εε
ε β β
+
+
−−
−
+
+
  
≥   
  
. 
b)  
W
d \  satisfies DBT(−∞) if and only if  1 ii γ γγ + = =  and  1
ii c
ii e
γ β β
−
+ ≥ . 
The results are similar to those above: The inequality aversion  i ε  of the subpopulation 
receiving the transfer must not be lower than the donor’s one. Furthermore, the ratio  1 ii β β +  
now has a lower bound depending on  i s  and  i c , respectively. 
(d)  Principles UBT and DBT 
Both principles can be combined. Then we have to exclude ‘circularity’: it must not be 
possible to apply at first one principle and then the other one to the same households. This 
requires 1 ii rs ≥  and  0 ii bc +≥ . We obtain a combination of the results presented in sub-
section (b) and (c):  
Proposition 8 
a)  Assume that d ∈\ and  1 ii rs ≥ . Then 
W
d \  satisfies UBT(d) and DBT(d) if and only if  1 ii ε εε + = =  and 
11
1 , ii i i i rs
εε β ββ
−−
+   ∈   
b)  Assume that  0 ii bc +≥ . Then 
W
−∞ \  satisfies UBT(−∞) and DBT(−∞) if and only if  1 ii γ γγ + = =  and  1 ,
ii bc
ii i ee
γγ β ββ
−
+  ∈ .  
In this case even for d ∈\ the parameters have to be identical. We obtain precise restrictions 
for the weight  1 i β + . The latter must belong to the interval 
11 , ii i i rs
εε β β
−−      and, respectively, 
,
ii bc
ii ee
γγ β β
−   . Thus the constants  , ii rs and  , ii bc impose bounds on the weights. The size of 
the subpopulations involved is no longer important since  1 ii ε εε + = = . 
4.3 Many  subpopulations 
Finally we consider the implications if one of the transfer principles introduced above is 
imposed on each pair of subpopulations i and  1 i +  for  1,..., 1 in = − .  
We establish   - 17 -
Proposition 6* [7*] 
a)  
W
d \  satisfies UBT(d) [DBT(d)] for  1,..., 1 in = −  and d ∈\ if and only if 
 {( 12 1 ... nn ε εε ε ε − ≤= = = ≤  for  0 n ε >   
or     12 1 ... nn ε εε ε ε − == = = ≤  for  0 n ε ≤  and  1 0 ε >    
or     1 ... n ε εε ===  otherwise) 
 [ 12 1 ... nn ε εε ε ε − ≤== = ≤ for 1 0 ε >    
or     12 2 ... n ε εε ε ε ==== ≤ for  1 0 ε ≤  and  0 n ε >    
or     1 ... n ε εε ===  otherwise] 
and 
 
1
1 11
11 2 1
1
1
(, ii i rr
n
εε
ε
εε β ββ β
−
−−
+

≤≤ 

 for  2,..., 2, in = − and 
1
11
1
n
n
nn n
n
r
n
εε
ε
ε β β
−
−
−−

≤ 

) 
 
1
1 11
11 2 1
1
1
[, iii ss
n
εε
ε
εε β ββ β
−
−−
+

≥≥ 

 for  2,..., 2, in = − and 
1
11
1
n
n
nn n
n
s
n
εε
ε
ε β β
−
−
−−

≥ 

]}. 
b)  
W
−∞ \  satisfies UBT(−∞) [DBT(−∞)] for  1,..., 1 in = −  if and only if  
  1 ... n γ γγ === and 
  1
ii b
ii e
γ β β + ≤  for  1,..., 1 in =−  
 [ 1
ii c
ii e
γ β β
−
+ ≥  for  1,..., 1 in =− ]. 
This proposition is easily proved by repeated application of the respective results derived in 
subsection 4.2. It is important to note that Proposition 6* also presents the outcome for an 
application of WBT(d) and WBT(−∞) (set  1 i r ≡  and  0 i b ≡ ). It turns out that the parameters 
i ε  have to be identical to ε  for  2,..., 1 in =−  (since these subpopulations may be the receiver 
and the donor of a transfer). The inequality aversion for the neediest and least needy sub-
population may differ from ε . If UBT(d) and DBT(d) are applied simultaneously (for d ∈\) 
this property vanishes. We obtain  
Proposition 8* 
a)  Assume that d ∈\ and  1, 1, 1 iii i rsr s <> ≥  for  1,..., in = .    - 18 -
W
d \  satisfies UBT(d) and DBT(d) for  1,..., 1 in = −  if and only if  1 ... n ε εε ===  and 
11
1 , ii i i i rs
εε β ββ
−−
+  ∈  for  1,..., 1 in =− . 
b)  Assume that  0, 0, 0 iii i bcb c <>+ ≥ .  
W
−∞ \  satisfies UBT(−∞) and DBT(−∞) for  1,..., 1 in = −  if and only if  1 ... n γ γγ == = and 
1 ,
ii bc
ii i ee
γγ β ββ
−
+  ∈  for  1,..., 1 in =− . 
Proposition 8* extends the results derived in Ebert (1995, 1997) to inequality concepts  0 d ≠  
and d ≠− ∞. 
Finally we examine the Strong Between-Type Transfer Principle. In this case the living 
standard of arbitrary subpopulations can be compared. We get 
Proposition 9 
a)  
W
d \  satisfies SBT(d) for  1,..., 1 in =−  and d ∈\ if and only if  1 ... n ε εε === , 
12 1 ... n β ββ =≤≤ ≤, and  () ( )
1
ii Et td d
ε β
− =− +  for  1,..., in = . 
b)  
W
−∞ \  satisfies SBT(−∞) for  1,..., 1 in =−  if and only if  1 ... n γ γγ = == ,  12 1 ... n β ββ ≤≤≤ , 
and  ()
1
ln ii Et t β
γ
=−  for  1,..., in = . 
In this case the welfare ordering and the equivalent income function used in the transfer 
principle SBT are closely related. One has to employ relative and, respectively, absolute 
equivalence scales. These scales are already uniquely implied by the welfare weights  i β . 
Then these equivalence scales and the implicit scales (see subsection 3.5) are identical. 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
Section 4 has dealt with the characterization of some classes of social welfare orderings. 
Therefore the results are described in terms of the coefficients of the corresponding welfare 
functions (9a) and (10a). For a description of the inequality measures it seems to be easier to 
use the ‘implicit’ equivalence scales. Therefore we have to translate the restrictions imposed 
on the coefficients into corresponding restrictions for scales. Since 
1
ii m
ε β
− =  and, respec-
tively, 
i a
i e
γ β = , we obtain the following equivalences:   - 19 -
  11 ii ii mm β β ++ ≤⇔ ≤,  
  [ ]
11
11 ,, ii i i i i i i i i rs m m r s m
εε ββ β
−−
++  ∈⇔ ∈   for d ∈\ 
and 
  11 ii i i aa β β ++ ≤⇔ ≤ ,  
  [ ] 11 ,,
ii bc
ii i i i i i i ee a a b a c
γγ ββ β
−
++  ∈⇔ ∈ − +   for d = −∞. 
These conditions allow us to describe the implications of the transfer principles for the 
measurement of inequality. 
The analysis presented above characterizes several (new) classes of welfare orderings and 
inequality orderings. Suppose, for example, that one wants to impose the transfer principle 
WBT and adheres to the relative inequality view. Then, for two different types, welfare 
functions of the following form satisfy this principle: 
  ()
1
2
11
1
i
i
i
n
i
ij
ij i
X
n
ε εε
ε
β
==
 
    
∑∑  
for  12 1 β β =≤  and  21 ε εε ≤ ≤ . 
Choosing  1 34 ε = ,  12 ε = ,  2 14 ε = , and  2 2 β =  we get the inequality measure 
  () () ()
12
2 2 14 23 2
34 1
0
11 12
11 2 1
1
12 12 2
nn
j
j
jj
X
I XX X
nn
µ
==
      =− +     ++      
∑∑  
which is a relative measure and allows us to treat the subpopulations differently. This form of 
inequality measure has not yet been discussed in the literature. 
The objective of the paper was to characterize several classes of ethical inequality measures 
when households may differ in needs and household types can be ranked by needs. The 
starting point of the analysis is the distribution of household income. Whereas in practice the 
distribution of household income is often adjusted in order to take into account differences in 
needs (by introducing weights and equivalizing incomes), here social welfare orderings are 
directly defined on the income distribution observed. In this framework two-level welfare 
orderings have been considered: In a first step the level of welfare of all households having 
the same type is determined. In a second step these welfare levels are aggregated to an overall 
welfare ordering which can accordingly be represented by a two-level welfare function.   - 20 -
Since we are interested in the derivation of ethical inequality measures we had at first to 
choose the class of inequality concepts. In this paper the set of linear or coherent concepts is 
examined. Then one has to describe the way an inequality measure is derived from a welfare 
function. It is defined as the welfare loss per household due to inequality by means of the 
social income function. Since the ethical inequality measures have to be consistent with the 
respective inequality concept the corresponding welfare function has to satisfy an appropriate 
homogeneity property. Given the class of nested welfare orderings and an inequality concept, 
the corresponding subclass of feasible welfare functions and inequality measures has been 
characterized precisely. 
Then four transfer principles (concerning the transfer of income between different household 
types) have been introduced and examined. They possess different power and define therefore 
different subclasses of welfare functions and inequality measures. As expected, the weaker 
the transfer the greater is the corresponding class of inequality measures. 
To sum up, the systematic analysis of this paper allows us to make a reasonable choice among 
several transfer principles in a heterogeneous population (for linear inequality concepts). The 
functional structure of the corresponding inequality measures has been completely derived. 
New possibilities have opened up. 
   - 21 -
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
We consider  () ()
d
d I TX λ  for d ∈ . Then 
 
() ()
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( )
() ()
() () () () ()
() ()
d d
d
d
X dddC X dd N d
IT X
Xd d d
Xd C X d dN d
Xd
λ
µλ λ
µλ
λµ λ
λµ
−+− − −+ −
=
−+−
−− − + −
=
−
11 11
11
11
 
and 
 
() ( ) ( )
() () () ()
() () () () () () () ()
d
dd
dd
dd d d
dd d d
IX ITX
C Xd d Nd CXNd
CT X NTCXN CT X TCX
λ
λλ λ λ
λλ
=
⇔− + − = −
⇔=⇔ =
11  
where  () () : dd CX CXN = . 
Now suppose that  ~
W
d XY . Then  ( ) ( ) dd WX WY =  and therefore by definition 
() () dd CX CY =  and thus  ( ) () ( ) ( )
dd
dd CT X CTY λλ = . The latter equation implies that 
() ( ) ~
dW d
d TX TY λλ , i.e. homogeneity of 
W
d \  with respect to  d J . 
We obtain for d =− ∞ 
 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () .
dd d
d
I TX TX CTX N
XC T X N
αα α
α
µ
µα
−∞ −∞
−∞
=−
=+ −
 
Therefore again 
  () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
dd d IXIT X CT X T CX αα α −∞ −∞ −∞ −∞ =⇔=  
The rest of the proof is the same as above.   
Proof of Proposition 2 
a)  Obvious 
b)  (i)  We at first prove that    - 23 -
  () ( ) () ()
dd TX T X λλ ξξ =  
for a  d J -homogeneous welfare ordering. By definition  () ~
W
d X X ξ 1 and 
() () ( ) ~
dW d
d TX TX λλ ξ 1.  d J -homogeneity implies that  ( )( ) ( ) ~
dW d
d TX T X λλ ξ 1 which proves 
the claim. 
(ii)  We consider 
  () () ()
1
1
1
i n
ii i
ii j i
j i
WX V VX X
n
ξ
−
=

== 
 ∑ . 
d J -homogeneity (see (i)) implies that 
  () () ()
11
11
11
ii nn
di d i
ii j ii j
jj ii
VV T X T VV X
nn
λλ
−−
==
   
=         
∑∑  
and therefore  
  () () ()
1
11
11
.
ii nn
di d i
ij i i i j
jj ii
VT X VT V VX
nn
λλ
−
==
  
=        
∑∑  
Setting  ()
1
:
i
ji j
i
tV X
n
=  we get 
  () () ()
11
11
1
.
i i nn
dd
ii i ji i j
jj i
VT V n t VT V t
n
λλ
−−
==
  
=        
∑∑  
Theorem 1 and its Corollary in Aczel (1966), p. 142 imply that there are constants  () a λ  and 
() b λ  such that 
  () ( ) ( ) () ()
1 d
ii VT V t a t b λ λ λ
− =+ . 
Now we replace t by  ()
1 : i sVt
− =  and obtain 
  () ( ) () () ( ) ii Vs d d a V s b λ λλ −+= + . 
Define rsd =− and  () ( ) : i f tV t d =+ . Then 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ii Vr da V r db λ λλ += ++  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) fra f rb λ λλ =+ .   - 24 -
The solution of this equation is given by Theorem 2.7.3 in Eichhorn (1978): There are 
0, 0, ρ ε ≠≠  and σ  such that 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ,,1 ft t a b
ε εε ρ σλ λ λ ρ λ =+ = =− 
or  () ( ) ( ) log , 1, log ft t a b ρ σλ λ ρ λ =+ = = . 
This implies the structural form of 
i W , and analogously of W. 
(iii)  Now we define 
1
1 : ii m ε β − =  and obtain  ii i mm
ε β
− = . Using Proposition 2b we consider 
 
() ()
()()
11 1 1
11 1 1
11
11
.
i i
i i
i i
i
i i
ii
i i
nn nn
ii
ii j i i i j
ij i j ii
i nn nn
j i
ii i j ii
ij i j ii i
nX d m m nX d
nn
Xd
mn m X d mn
nn m
εε εε
εε ε
ε ε ε εε
ε εε ε
β
−
== = =
−
== = =

−= − 

  − 
 =− =      
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
 
Changing the normalization from  hh n β Σ  to  hh mn Σ  we obtain the result. 
c)  The proof of (10a) runs along the same lines. See also Proposition 2 in Ebert (1997).   
Now we define 
1
:l n ii a β
γ
=  and obtain 
i a
i e
γ β = . Using Proposition 2c we consider 
 
() ()
11 1 1
11 1 1
11
11
ii
ii ii
ij ij i
ii
ii i i
ij i ij ii
nn nn
XX a
ii i
ij i j ii
nn nn
Xa X a
ii
ij i j ii
ne e ne
nn
ne e n e
nn
γγ γγ
γγ γ
γ γγ γ
γ γ γγ γ
β
−−
== = =
−− −
== = =
 
=  
 
  
==   
  
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
 
which proves the result.   
Proof of Proposition 3 
a)  We consider 
 
1
min
n
ii
i
nλ
= ∑  s.t.  ( ) ( )
1 1 ,...,
n dn n n d WW X λλ = 11 . 
Introducing the Lagrange parameter κ  and the Lagrange function L we obtain 
  ()
1
11 11
0
ii i
i
ih h i i
mn d
n
mn m m
ε
ε ελ
κ
λε
−
−  ∂−
=− =  ∂Σ 
…
L
   - 25 -
and therefore 
 
j i
ij
d d
mm
λ λ − −
=  for  , 1,..., ij n =      or      1
i
i
d
d
m
λ
λ
−
= − . 
Then 
  () ()
()
1
11
11
11
1
,...,
i
i
i
in
n n
ii
dn n n
ij hh i
mn
Wd d
mn n
dd
ε εε
ε
λλ λ
λλ
==
 
 =− +   Σ  
=− + =
∑∑ 11
 
and by assumption 
 
1
1
11
1
i
i
i i n n
j ii
ij hh i i
Xd mn
d
mn n m
ε εε ε
λ
==
   −   =+    Σ    
∑∑ . 
The FOC’s imply that  ( ) 1 ii md d λλ =− +  and therefore 
  () ( ) () () 11
11 1
.
nn n
di i i i i i
ii i
CX n n m d d m n d N d λλ λ
== =
== − + = − + ∑∑ ∑  
b)  For d =− ∞ we similarly derive  
  ii j j aa λ λ −=− for  , 1,..., ij n = . 
See also Ebert (1997).   
Proof of Proposition 5 
Set 1 i r =  or  0 i b =  and use Proposition 6. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
a)  Exponents 
(i)  UBT(d) is satisfied if and only if  1
dd
ii
kl
WW
X X
+
∂ ∂
<
∂∂
  for  
1 ii
ki l Xr X
+ > . 
The inequality is equivalent to 
  ()() ()()
11 11 11 1
1
ii i i ii i i ii
ik i l
hh hh
XX X X
nn
εε ε εε ε β β
ξξ
ββ
++ −− − − ++ +
+ <
ΣΣ
. (*)   - 26 -
Leaving 
i
k X  constant and letting  ( )
i
i X ξ →∞ implies that  0 i ε ε −≤ . Similarly 
()
1
1
i
i X ξ
+
+ →∞ (for constant 
1 i
l X
+ ) yields  1 0 i ε ε + − ≥ . Thus we obtain  1 ii ε εε + ≤≤. 
(ii)  1 0 i ε + ≤ : In this case  ()
1
1 0
i
i X ξ
+
+ →  if 
1 0
i
j X
+ →  for all  j l ≠ . Therefore  1 0 i ε ε + −≤ . 
Then we get  1 0 i ε ε + =≤ . 
(iii)  0 ε ≤ : Then  1 0 i ε ε + ≤ ≤  and thus  1 i ε ε + =  by (ii). 
(iv) 0 i ε ≤ : By the same argument we obtain  0 i ε ε − ≥  and therefore  i ε ε =  and 
1 ii ε εε + ==. 
Weights 
(i) Suppose  that 1 0 i ε + >  
Since 0 i ε ε −≤  the LHS of (*) is maximal (given 
i
k X  and 
1 i
l X
+ ) if  0
i
j X →  for all  jk ≠ . 
Then the LHS tends to  ()
1
1 1
i
i
i ii i
kk
hh i
XX
nn
εε ε
ε β
β
−
−  
  Σ   
.  
Analogously, since  1 0 i ε ε + − ≥  the RHS is minimal if 
1 0
i
j X
+ →  for  jl ≠  (given 
i
k X ). Then 
the following inequality has to be fulfilled: 
  () ()
1
1 11 1
1
1
11
ii
ii ii
ik i l
ii
XX
nn
εε εε
εε ε ε
ββ
+
+
−−
− − +
+
+
  
≤   
  
. 
It is equivalent to 
  () ( )
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii ii
ii l k
ii
XX
nn
εε ε ε
εε ε ε
ββ
+
+
−−
− − +
+
+
  
≤   
  
. 
Since  10 ε −< the RHS is minimal for given 
1 i
l X
+  if 
1 ii
ki l Xr X
+ → . 
We obtain 
 
1
1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii i
ii
r
nn
εε ε ε
εε
ε ββ
+
+
−−
−
+
+
  
≤   
  
. 
(ii)  1 0 i ε + ≤  and  0 i ε > : Then  1 i ε ε + =  implies   - 27 -
 
1
1
1
i
i
ii i
i
r
n
εε
ε
ε ββ
−
−
+

≤ 

. 
(iii) 0 i ε ≤ : Then 
1
1 ii i r
ε ββ
−
+ ≤ . 
b)  Exponents 
UBT(−∞) is satisfied if and only if  1 ii
kl
WW
X X
+
∂ ∂
<
∂∂
 for 
1 ii
kl i XX b
+ >+ . 
The inequality is equivalent to 
 
() () () ()
1 1 11 1 1 .
ii ii ii i i ik i l XX XX ii
hh hh
ee e e
nn
γγξ γγ ξ γγ β β
ββ
+ + ++ + −− −− −− + <
ΣΣ
 (**) 
Leaving 
i
k X  constant and letting  ( )
i
i X ξ →∞ implies that  0 i γ γ −≥ . Similarly 
()
1
1
i
i X ξ
+
+ →∞ (for constant 
1 i
l X
+ ) yields  1 0 i γ γ + − ≤ . Therefore  1 ii γ γγ + ≤ ≤ . 
Then it is possible to consider  ()
i
i X ξ →∞ and  ( )
1
1
i
i X ξ
+
+ →− ∞. We obtain  1 ii γ γγ + ≤≤ 
and therefore  1 ii γ γγ + == . 
Weights 
Then 
 
1
1
1
ii
ik i l XX
ii ee
γγ ββ
+
+ −−
+ < . 
The RHS of (**) is maximal (for given 
1 i
l X
+ ) if 
1 ii
kl i XX b
+ = + . Thus 
  ( )
1 1
1
1
i i il i il Xb X
ii ee
γ γ ββ
+ +
+ −+ −
+ ≤   and   1
ii b
ii e
γ ββ + ≤    
Proof of Proposition 7 
This case can be handled by switching the indices and the inequality sign in the proof of 
Proposition 6. Then we obtain 
a)  Exponents 
(i) General  case:  1 ii ε εε + ≤ ≤  
(ii) 0 i ε ≤ : Then  i ε ε =    - 28 -
(iii)  0 ε ≤  implies  i ε ε =  
(iv)  1 0 i ε + ≤  yields  1 ii ε εε + ==  
Weights 
Here we get 
 
1
1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii i
ii
s
nn
εε ε ε
εε
ε ββ
+
+
−−
−
+
+
 
≥  
 
 
and thus 
 
1
1 1
1
1
11
ii
ii
ii i
ii
s
nn
εε ε ε
εε
ε ββ
+
+
−−
−
+
+
  
≥   
  
. 
b)  Exponents 
  1 ii γ γγ + == 
Weights 
Then 
 
1
1
1
ii
il i k XX
ii ee
γγ ββ
+
+ −−
+ < . 
The LHS is maximal if 
1 ii
lk i XX c
+ =+ . Thus 
 
1
1
i
i ik i
ik
Xc
X
ii ee
γ
γ ββ
+
 −+  − 
+ ≤   and   1
i c
ii e
γ ββ + ≤ .   
Proof of Proposition 8 
a)  We obtain  1 ii ε εε + ==  and thus 
 
11
1 ii i i i rs
ε ε ββ β
−−
+ ≤≤ . 
The constants  i r  and  i s  have to be chosen appropriately; i.e. it must not be possible that 
BOTH transfers are feasible. That would be the case if 
  ( )
1 ii i
ki l i i k Xr X s r X
+ >> . 
This condition cannot be met if  1 ii rs≥ . In this case the interval 
11 , ii i i rs
εε β β
−−     is nonvoid.   - 29 -
We similarly obtain  1 ,
ii bc
ii i ee
γγ β ββ
−
+  ∈  and  0 ii bc + ≥ . 
Proof of Proposition 9 
(i)  Using the representation (11) we obtain 
11 1
1
11
11 1 1 1
11
ii
ii i
i
i
ii i
jj di i k
ii i i
kh h i i i i i i ii
ii
jj ii
h h ii ii
Xd Xd Wm n X d
mn
X m n nm nm nm m
Xd Xd mn
m n nm nm
ε εε εε εε ε
ε εε ε
ε
ε
εε
− −
−
−
    −−  ∂Σ −   =Σ ⋅ Σ ⋅ ⋅      ∂Σ      
    −− Σ   =Σ ⋅ Σ    Σ    
 
1
1
.
i
i i i
k
i
Xd
m
εε ε ε
−
−    −  ⋅     
 
Now suppose that δ  is redistributed from 
i
k X  to 
1 i
l X
+ . 
Then 
  1
dd
ii
kl
WW
X X
+
∂∂
<
∂∂
  
  
if and only if  1 ii ε εε + ==  and 
1
1
ii
kl
ii
X dX d
mm
+
+
−−
≤  for  ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
ik i l EX E X
+
+ ≥ . 
We get an analogue if  ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
il i k EX E X
+
+ ≥  and therefore  
 
1
1
ii
kl
ii
X dX d
mm
+
+
−−
=  for  ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
ik i l EX E X
+
+ = . 
This has to be true for  1,..., 1 in =− .  
Therefore  
  () ()
11
1
i
ik l l EX EX X ==  
and 
  () ()
1
i i
ik i k
ik
i
EX d Xd
EX d
mm
− −
== − . 
We obtain   - 30 -
  ()
i
i k
ik
ii
X d
EX d
mm

=+ − 

  and   () 11
11
i
i k
ik
ii
X d
EX d
εε ββ −−

 =+ −  

. 
Property (iii) of the equivalent income function implies that  12 ... n β ββ ≤ ≤≤ . 
(ii)  Using the representation (12) we obtain 
 
()
() () ()
()
()
()
1
1
11 1 1
1
11
.
1
i
ii
ij i i k i
i
i
ij i
i
i iki i
ij i
i
i
ij i
Xa Xa i
i i
Xa ki i i i
i
Xa
Xa
Xa i i
i
Wn
ee
XN n n n
e
Nn
e
e
Nn n
e
Nn
γγ
γγ
γγ
γ
γγ γ
γ
γγ
γ
γ
γ
γγ
−
−− −− −∞
−−
− −−
−−
−−
 ∂
=− ⋅ Σ ⋅ ⋅ −  ∂  
ΣΣ 


=⋅ Σ 
 
ΣΣ 

 
 
Now suppose that δ  is redistributed from 
i
k X  to 
1 i
l X
+ . 
Then   1 ii
kl
WW
X X
−∞ −∞
+
∂∂
<
∂∂
  
 if and only if  ij γ γγ = =   and   ( ) ( )
1
11
ii
i k i ili Xa X a
ee
γγ
+
+ + −− − −
<  
for  ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
ik i l EX E X
+
+ ≥ . 
We get an analogous result if  ( ) ( )
1
1
ii
il i k EX E X
+
+ ≥  and therefore 
1
1
ii
ki l i XaX a
+
+ −= −  for 
( ) ( )
1
1
ii
ik i l EX E X
+
+ = . This has to be true for  1,..., 1 in = − . 
Therefore 
  () ()
11
1
i
ik l l EX EX X ==   and   ( ) ( ) 1
ii i
k i ik ik XaE X aE X −= −= . 
Now observe that 
1
ln ii a β
γ
= . Property (iii) of the equivalent income function again implies 
that  12 ... n aa a ≤≤ ≤.   